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Introduction 
Inflows of foreign capital have traditionally been viewed as 
beneficial for developing countries, but the current international debt 
problems facing many developing countries have called this view into 
question. The present paper does not, however, focus on repayments 
crises, but rather on the impact of capital inflows themselves on the 
agricultural sectors of developing countries. Until the 1970s, resource 
transfers from developed to developing countries were largely through 
foreign assistance; commodity assistance, such as food aid, in some cases 
and foreign exchange assistance in other cases. Both forms of assistance 
have been used since World War II to transfer large amounts of resources 
to developing countries in an effort to promote economic development in 
general and often agricultural development in particular. The view that 
more foreign assistance is always better than less has prevailed through 
out the post-war period, and foreign assistance expanded at particularly 
high rates during the 1960s and 1970s [Larson and Vogel]. 
During the 1970s, private international capital markets became more 
open to many developing countries, and capital transfers on commercial 
terms increased.suhs±antially. Borrowers included not only private 
sector firms in developing countries, but also public sector enterprises 
and governments themselves. It was not until the international debt 
crises of the early 1980s that developing country borrowers and their 
creditors began to question seriously the belief that more capital 
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transfers, including foreign assistance, were always better than less. As 
strong world aarkets for exports together with growing economies and low 
real interest rates during the 1970s changed to weak world markets, 
stagnant econoai~s and hign real interest rates in the early 1980s, aany 
developing countries began to experience serious difficulties in servic-
ing their external debt, much to the disaay of their external creditors. 
Several of the largest developing country borrowers have reached the 
verge of default, sending shock waves throughout international financial 
markets. One indication of this problem is that the number of foraal 
debt reschedulings for World Bank members increased froa an average of 
four per year in 1975-80 to a high of 31 involving 21 countries in 1983. 
Formal debt reschedulings have continued to be a major issue for 
developed and developing countries since 1983. A number of countries have 
rescheduled their debt several times and aay need to reschedule 'the debt 
several more times before the debt can be realistically serviced by thea 
(Table 1). Changing commodity prices, interest rates, trade restrictions, 
weak world economies and difficult trade-offs between servicing~he 
foreign debt and internal econoaic growth are some of the •ore iaportant 
reasons for the large nuaber of debt reschedulings. Soae countries, 
especially in Latin America, have already stopped the interest and prin-
cipal pa~ents (defaulted) on their coamercial bank debt while continuing 
to service the bilateral and multilateral private and public debt. These 
countries can no longer obtain commercial bank credit 1for•their commercial 
trade and investment activities. One option to solve tbe debt problem 
which foreign banks hold with these countries is to write down the loans 
and recognize that this debt is currently being traded at a substantial 
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discount (dis~ounts of 30 percent and more are not uncommon) in world 
financial markets. However, the foreign banks c~ntinue to carry these 
loans in their loan portfolio at face value because a write down of these 
loans would have a major impact on bank profits, stock prices and the 
entire financial system. Banks and governments are very reluctant to 
pursue this option. Developing countries, foreign bank lenders and 
investors are also considering debt-equity swaps as another option to 
reduce the debt burden of these countries. In the debt-equity swaps an 
investor buys the debt from the lending bank and then goes to the bor-
rowing country to exchange the debt for an equity position in some 
enterprise in that particular country. The debt-equity swap option 
appears to have very limited potential for dramatically reducing the debt 
of developing countries because the amount of debt is very large and the 
number of investment options that a country is willing to make available 
may be quite limited. 
The largest developing country debtor nation in the world, Brazil. 
announced in a nationally televised speech by President Jose Sarney on 
February 20, 1987, that it was suspending interest payments on its com-
mercial bank debt of about $67 billion. On March 12, 1987, Ecuador 
suspended interest payments on its $8.2 billion foreign debt citing the 
earthquake that destroyed a 25 mile stretch of the nation's oil pipeline 
as t~reeseft for this unilateral action. The decision of the Brazilian 
government sent shock waves throughout the U.S. and world financial 
system, while the Ecuadorian decision did not have such a large impact 
because the amount borrowed is much smaller. According to President 
Sarney, Brazil's commitment to economic growth and democracy is not 
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compatible with the massive transfer of resources required by the debt-
rescheduling model applied up to now [Truell and Cohen]. Brazil's 
moratorium on commercial bank debt affects about 700 creditor banks and' 
the bulk of its total debt of about $109 billion. Brazil had already 
stopped making principal payments on this debt some time ago in an earlier 
debt negotiation process. Like most other developing countries, Brazil 
wants to limit debt servicing to some smaller amount such as no more than 
2.5 percent of gross national product, compared to scheduled debt payments 
for 1987 of 3.3 to 4.5 percent of GNP or from $9.6 to $12.5 billion 
[Truell and Cohen]. For many other developing countries such as Peru, 
Bolivia, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Venezuela and The Philippines, debt 
service obligations are a larger share of the total economy than for 
Brazil. They are obviously even more interested in attempting to limit 
the amount of debt servicing. 
The moratorium affects medium and long term international com-
mercial bank debt but does not affect Brazil's debt to governments and 
international lending agencies or its short term debt with international 
banks. Brazil wants to start talking with commercial banks about its debt 
in the near future and also seems to want to involve governments more 
directly in the process in an attempt to politicize the process. Other 
developing countries may watch the process with great interest because a 
number of them (Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, Egypt, and The Philippines, 
for example) are currently re-negotiating their debt. This represents a 
test case with a major borrower and an ally of the Western world. 
The U.S. financial system is more affected by the potential debt 
problem in developing countries than European banks because of the greater 
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amount of loans to these countries. In the case of Brazil, the biggest 
U.S. banks with loans are Citicorp, $4.6 billion; Ch~se Manhattan. $2.8 
billion; Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Company, $1.9 billion; J.P. Morgan 
and Company, $1.9 billion; and Banker's Trust Company, $874 million. This 
lending has important implications for the banking system of the U.S. 
because interest on loans more than 90 days overdue must be classified as 
non-performing loans, and banks would have to make loan loss provisions 
against those loans. Since the loan amounts are so large, this decision 
would greatly reduce bank profits, bank stock prices, and affect the 
entire banking system. One can be sure that developing and developed 
countries alike want to avoid the enormous problems associated with 
default on this large foreign debt that could, if not resolved, lead to a 
crisis of the entire world financial system. 
One approach to solving the repayment problems of developing 
countries involves some combination of additional capital inflows and 
more generous repayment terms. However, foreign debt cannot continue to 
grow indefinitely relative to gross national product. At some point more 
appropriate economic policies must be carried out by developing countries 
themselves in order to expand exports of goods and services or reduce 
imports and thereby curtail the growth of foreign debt relative to gross 
national product. Because agriculture is a major sector for most, if not 
all, developing countries, the impa~t of eeonomic policies on agricul-
tural output, and especially on imports and exports, cannot be ignored. 
If inflows of foreign capital had adverse impacts on developing country 
agriculture when they originally occurred, additional such transfers from 
developed to developing countries are unlikely to be an appropriate 
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solution to current problems without substantial policy changes. 
Foreign Capital Inflows 
The main purpose of the present paper is to examine whether foreign 
capital inflows may have adversely affected agricultural performance in a 
significant number of developing countries. Foreign capital inflows 
create opportunities for developing countries to allocate additional 
resources to promote more rapid growth, possibly within the agricultural 
sector, and to earn more foreign exchange to service the debt ihcurred. 
However, such opportunities may be wasted if increased capital inflows 
enable developing countries to delay aaking policy changes that could be 
more appropri~te for the longer run. For example, exchange rate policies 
together with agricultural price policies can stimulate growth in the 
agricultural sector or can contribute to its stagnation. Policies that 
maintain over-valued exchange rates can contribute to low agricultural 
prices thereby discouraging farm production "and exports while encouraging 
food imports [Bale and Lutz, Schuh]. In addition to exchange rates, other 
agricultural price policies that are ~ommonly used to hold doWb ~arm and 
food prices lnclude price ceilings, forced sales of products ~o government 
agencies at low prices, agricultural export restrictions, and "taxes" 
levied on farmers by commodity marketing boards. A study of price dis-
tortions in seven developing countries, (Argentina, Egypt, Kertya, 
Pakistan, Portugal, Thailand, and Yugoslavia) found substantial dis-
incentive effects on food production~because of heavy implicit and 
explicit taxation of the agricultural sector [Lutz and Scandizzo]. Agri-
culture was penalized in 21 out of the•24 cases studied'in'these seven 
countries. Additional evidence on the heavy taxation of the agricultural 
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sector was found in Costa Rica, Honduras, and The Dominican Republic 
[Larson and Vogel, and Larson]. As a consequence, agricultural production 
is discouraged, while consumption is subsidized, and the opportunity for 
more foreign exchange earnings from agriculture is lost. 
Foreign capital inflows may under certain circumstances be associ-
ated with declining agricultural exports and increasing agricultural 
imports. The increased foreign exchange made available through capital 
inflows may resolve problems of foreign exchange scarcity for the 
borrowing country in the short run and thereby allow foreign debt to be 
serviced and imports to continue. At the same time, the increased 
availability of foreign exchange may permit an over-valued exchange rate 
to develop or to be maintained. Most developing countries fix the value 
of their currency in relation to the currency of a major trading partner 
{e.g., the U.S. dollar). If significant amounts of foreign currency 
loans can be obtained, such exchange rates can be maintained substan-
tially above the value that would be determined in a free market. If the 
exchange rate is thus over-valued, revenues received by producers for 
export sales are accordingly reduced in terms of the domestic currency, 
so that incentives for producers to export, or even to produce those 
products which might be exported, are reduced. In a similar way the 
domestic currency costs of imported goods are reduced, so that incentives 
to import are increased. Furthermore, the attractiveness of low cost 
imports discourages the production of domestic import substitutes even 
when such import substitutes may reflect international comparative 
advantage. 
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The net effect of an over-valued exchange rate is to tax exports and 
subsidize imports, thereby not only failing to correct the underlying 
cause of foreign exchange scarcity but also possibly exacerbating the 
problem. A country that fails to adjust its policies in order to expand 
exports and curtail imports will need to continue foreign borrowing in 
the future to cover its foreign exchange gap, and this gap is likely to 
grow because of interest payments on a growing foreign debt. A country's 
foreign debt cannot, moreover, continue increasing without liait relative 
to its output, but can only delay the ultimate need to adjust - most 
probably through a move to a more appropriate exchange rate. In the 
meantime, an over-valued exchange rate impacts adversely on agricultural 
output, with repercussions throughout the economy since in •ost develop 
ing countries agriculture is a relatively large sector and agricultural 
exports represent a major source of exchange earnings [Chambers and 
Just]. 
A country's exchange rate can initially become over-valued because 
of an adverse shift in the terms of trade or, more commonly in recent 
years, because of differential rates of inflation; that is, the exchange 
rate will tend to become over-valued as a country's rate of inflation 
exceeds the rates of inflation experienced by its major trading partners. 
Domestic costs and prices will increase faster than the costs and prices 
of the goods produced in foreign couhtries, making the latter relatively 
less expensive, and thereby retarding exports and encouraging imports 
[Frankel]. Protective trade policies such as import tariffs and quotas 
and export taxes and quotas can also lead to an implicit over-valuation 
of the exchange rate by raising the domestic prices of protected goods 
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and lowering the prices in domestic currency of exported goods. The 
structure of protection in developing countri3s typically raises the 
prices of industrial goods, many of which serve as inputs into agricul-
tural production, while agricultural output is left relatively unpro-
tected so that farmers producing both exports and import substitutes are 
penalized.!/ 
In summary, capital inflows allow an over-valued exchange rate to 
develop or to be maintained, at least in the short run. This over-valu-
ation of the exchange rate acts as an implicit tax on the agricultural 
sector in developing countries that export agricultural goods. At the 
same time, consumers of food and other users of agricultural goods are 
subsidized indirectly through the low domestic currency prices of these 
imports, particularly those which are unprotected. Depressed prices 
reduce the incentives for domestic agricultural production, and this can 
be especially pronounced for exports and import substitutes. [Larson and 
Vogel]. In such a situation developing countries often tend to export 
less and to import more and may thus become increasingly dependent on 
capital inflows as a source of foreign exchange rather than on the 
production of commodities sold in international markets. When inflows 
come in the form of foreign assistance, especially food aid, the adverse 
impact on the agricultural output of a developing country can be even 
more direct. Foreign aid in the form of low interest loans for agricul-
ture can also directly disrupt agricultural production by reducing savings 
mobilization and causing credit outflows from rural areas that actually 
reduce resources available for agriculture. 
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Agricultural Trade of Developing Country Borrowers 
In order to evaluate the impact of foreign capital inflows on 
developing country agriculture, the present paper exaaines the ratio of 
foreign debt t~ gross national product in seventy-three developing 
countries as compared to the ratios of agricultural imports and exports 
to gross national product for these same countries. Figures for foreign 
debt outstanding and disbursed are taken froa the World Bank's World Debt 
Tables and may be understated for soae countries because short-term debt 
(under one year) is not included and because private sector debt without 
government guarantee may not be fully reported. Foreign debt is defined 
as debt that has an original maturity of over one year (long-term debt) 
and that is owed to nonresidents and repayable in foreign currency, 
goods, or services. The World Debt Tables also report figures for gross 
national product in U.S. dollars converted at the official e~change rate 
and are thus subject to the usual problems of such conversions. Agricul-
tural imports and exports are taken from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization's Trade Yearbook. Data are for the years 1g73 through 
1983, which covers the period of major growth in the foreign debt of 
developing countries. The seventy three developing countr~ borrower• 
selected for this analysis includes all the countries with over 500 
aillion dollars of total debt outstanding and disbursed in 1983. 
If inflows of foreign capital are in fact damaging agriculturaJ 
output in general and the production of agricultural exports an~ import 
substitutes in particular, an increase in foreign debt relative t~ gross 
national product should be associated with increasing imports and 
decreasing exports relative to gross national product. Thus, for each of 
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the seventy three developing countries in the sample, the change in the 
ratio of foreign debt to gross national product from one year to the next 
has been correlated with the changes in the ratios of agricultural 
imports and exports to gross national product. In addition, because of 
substantial year-to-year variations in debt and gross national product, 
and especially in agricultural production and hence imports and exports. 
three year averages have also been used. That is, the ratios of foreign 
debt, agricultural imports and agricultural exports to gross national 
product have been averaged for the first three years of the period, 
1973-1975, and subtracted from the same ratios averaged over the last 
three years of the period, 1981-83. This can be seen as providing a 
longer term, and probably more appropriate, view of the impact of capital 
inflows on developing country agriculture. 
The evidence for the seventy three developing country borrowers in 
the sample is shown in Table 2. As expected, the change in the three 
year average ratio of foreign debt to gross national product from 1973-75 
to 1981-83 is positive for sixty-two of the seventy-three countries which 
means that the large majority of the countries were relatively deeper in 
debt at the end of this period than at the beginning of it. The most 
striking cases are Costa Rica, Guyana, Mauritania, Togo and Peoples 
Republic of Yemen; countries that nearly doubled their foreign debt 
relative to gross national product in this period. Only eleven countries 
reduced their foreign debt to gross national product ratio from the 
average of 1973-75 to the average of 1981-83. Pakistan achieved the 
largest reduction in its foreign debt relative to gross national product 
in this period. 
12 
Changes in the average value of agricultural imports relative to 
gross national product and agricultural exports relative to gross 
national product from 1973-75 to 1981-83 are shown in Table 2. For 
thirty-eight of the countries, the results a~e totallg consistent with 
the expected relationship between changes in foreign debt relative to 
gross national product and agricultural imports relative to gross 
national product. Increasing foreign debt leads to increasing agricul-
tural imports and decreasing debt leads to decreasing agricultural 
imports. The results are even better for the relationship between 
foreign debt and agricultural exports. In forty-seven of the countries. 
increases (decreases) of the foreign debt to gross national product ratio 
are associated with decreases {increases) of the agricultural exports ~o 
gross national product ratio. 
Table 2 shows the results of the correlation coefficients between 
the yearly changes in the ratio of foreign debt to gross national product 
and the yearly changes in the ratio of·agricultural import• to gross 
national product. The correlation ebefficient for fifty of the seventy-
three countries is positive indicating that increasing deHt i~ associated 
with increasing agricultural imports. ~hese results are also consistent 
with the expected relationship between these two variables. When the 
yearly changes in the ratio of foreign debt tb gross ndtional product •re 
correlated with the yearly changes in the ratio of agricultural-exports 
to gross national product, the results are not as consistent with the 
expected relationship. Changes in the foreign debt ratio are negatively 
correlated with the agricultural export ratio for onlyrtwenty-three of 
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the seventy-three countries. The weaker and less consistent correlations 
between changes in the foreign debt ratio and the agricu)tural export 
ratio compared to the expected relationship and compared to the results of 
the correlations between the foreign debt ratio and the agricultural 
import ratio may be explained in part by the difference in the composition 
of agricultural exports compared to agricultural imports. In most 
developing countries the agricultural exports are concentrated in a few 
main crops which are subject to substantial fluctuations in prices and 
quantities while agricultural imports are not concentrated in a few crops 
and are less subject to severe price and quantity fluctuations. 
Agricultural Trade of a Developed Country Borrower 
The effect of exchange rates on agricultural trade can be analyzed 
using U.S. agriculture as a developed country example of how these macro-
economic factors can affect trade and financial flows. Under the gold 
standard system of the Bretton Woods Agreement which continued until 1971, 
the U.S. was obligated to maintain the price of gold at $35 per ounce 
while other countries pegged their currency to the U.S. dollar with com-
mitments in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this system, the 
credibility of the dollar was backed by the goJd stock of the U.S. When 
the U.S. ran a balance of payments deficit, some foreign countries would 
have to increase their reserves of gold or hold dollars and supply their 
own currency to stabilize the foreign exchange market. The U.S. supplied 
both gold and dollars to the foreign exchange market. This exchange rate 
system operated throughout the 1944-1971 period when agricultural exports 
were relatively unimportant in terms of U.S. farm sales. For 1940, the 
value of farm exports was $2.9 billion (adjusted to 1985 dollars) and 
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increased at a steady rate of about $400 million (1985 dollars) per year 
{Rossailler]. During much of this period the multilateral trade ~eighted 
value of the U.S. dollar (March 1973 equals 100) was increasing (becoming 
overvalued) and reached levels of 120 and higher. The cvervalued dollar 
made U.S. farm exports more and more expensive and less price competitive 
to foreign buyers. 
The U.S. dollar was devalued in 1971 and again in 1973 when the gold 
standard system was abandoned. The price of gold quickly !ncr~ased fro• 
the $35 per ounce guaranteed rate to over $350 per ounce in the fre~ 
market. The price of gold henceforth would be determined by suppl~ ~d 
demand in a freely competitive market. The dollar was no longer backed by 
gold but was instead backed by the the ability and willingness of the U .. s. 
to restrict the supply of dollars. ~ith these devaluations the tra~e 
weighted value of the dollar decreased from over 120 to less than 100 in 
1973, 1974, and 1975. The agricultural export boom from 1973 to 1981 was 
fueled by these devaluations, the world oil shock, and strpqg ~conomi~ 
growth worldwide. During these golden days for American agrjculture, farm 
exports increased at the rate of $2.1 billion (1985 dollars) .per year 9r 
about five times the rate of increase in the 1940-1972 period. Agric~l­
tural exports increased rapidly from 1973 until 1981 when they reached a 
peak of nearly $44 billion. It is most interesting to note that the 
multilateral trade weighted value of the U.S. dollar was,declinin~ 
throughout most of this period and reached a low of 87.A in 1980. 
The export decline began in 1982 when ~gricultural e~ports dropped by 
$4.7 billion (1985 dollars) caused primarily by a strong doll~r. a 
worldwide recession, a second oil shock and a tight monetary policy to 
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counter inflation in the U.S. and other developed countries. Farm exports 
continued to decline from 1982 to 1986 at the rate of about $1 6 billion 
(1985 dollars) annually to a low of about $26 billion in 1986. It is 
widely believed that farm exports have now leveled off and no further 
declines are expected. In the 1982-1986 period the multilateral trade 
weighted value of the dollar increased to a high of 156.5 in the first 
quarter of 1985 before beginning to decline in the remainder of 1985. 
1986. and into 1987. The strong dollar not only led to decreased agri-
cultural exports but also led to increased agricultural imports so that 
the U.S. agricultural trade balance changed from a surplus to a deficit 
for the first time in over 25 years. 
During this period of the strong dollar. capital inflows to the U.S. 
from foreign countries. especially Japan, were very large. Foreign 
capital was attracted to the U.S. because of the high interest rates that 
prevailed in the economy and the belief that the U.S. was a safe place to 
invest. The large inflow of foreign capital also kept the dollar strong 
in world markets because all these investors were buying dollars to place 
in the U.S. This large inflow of foreign capital helped to finance the 
U.S. fiscal deficits that were growing rapidly in the 1980s and also 
helped to offset the balance of trade deficit that was getting increas-
ingly large in this same period. The U.S. became the largest debtor 
nation of the world in terms of the absolute amount owed during this 
period. 
Thus. fluctuating exchange rates in combination with other economic 
events have had a significant impact on U.S. agricultural exports and 
imports in the recent past. An overvalued exchange rate has been asso-
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elated with declining agricultural exports and increasing agricultural 
iaports. At the same time, large capital inflows froa foreign countries 
maintained the strength of the dollar at high levels in spite of a large 
trade imbalance. This situation is siailar to developing countries that 
have large capital inflows that enable those countries to maintain an 
overvalued exchange rate for extended periods of time when exports are 
declining and imports are increasing. 
Conclusions 
Foreign capital inflows appear to affect adversely the performance 
of developing country agriculture, especially the production of agricul-
tural exports and import substitutes. Foreign borrowing apparently 
permits over-valued exchange rates to develop or to be maintained, 
thereby reducing incentives to export and increasing incentives to 
import. The evidence for seventy three developing country borrowers 
indicates that an increasing ratio of foreign debt to gross national 
product is closely associated with an increasing ratio of agricultural 
imports to gross national product, but the relationship of foreign debt 
to gross national product with the ratio of agricultural exports to gross 
national product is less clear. The lack of a close association may be 
due to the concentration of agricultural exports of most developing 
countries in a few main crops which are subject to substantial fluctua-
tions in prices and quantities produced. In any case, the fact that the 
relationship between increasing debt and decreasing agricultural exports 
is less clear than the strong relationship of increasing debt to increas-
ing agricultural imports undercuts the argument of reverse causation -
that decreased agricultural exports can lead to increased capital 
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inflows. In fact, if there is any reverse causation it may be the 
opposite - that increased agricultural exports lead to increased credit 
worthiness in international capital markets and hence increased capital 
inflows. 
Large inflows of foreign capital during the 1970s appear to have 
been ill-advised for many developing countries, not only because of 
subsequent payments crises but also because of adverse impacts on the 
agricultural sector performance. Further foreign borrowing, especially to 
rescue countries with debt repayment problems, is unlikely to resolve 
the basic problems that led to debt crises, unless such borrowing is 
accompanied by significant changes in economic policy with respect to 
exchange rates and other possible distortions. In fact, foreign capital 
inflows that rescue countries from debt problems in the short run may 
thereby delay the policy changes necessary for long-term economic growth 
and development. This does not mean, however, that foreign capital 
inflows can never be a complement to basic policy changes. For example, 
as mentioned above, exchange rates can become implicitly over-valued 
through the structure of protection, and protection is often tightened 
and turned further against the agricultural sector in response to inter-
national payments crises. Foreign capital inflows thus can sometimes help 
to assist in import liberalization, or at least reduce the threat of 
inereeeee pPOteetion. Capital inflows, especially in the form of foreign 
aid, can also provide developing country governments with resources that 
can be used to compensate losers in the process of trade and financial 
liberalization and thereby allow the liberalization process to continue. 
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Footnote 
1/See Balassa and Associates for a full discussion of effective 
protection and for estimates of effective protection for several develop-
ing countries. More recent estimates of effective protection for 
selected countries can be found in Bale and Lutz. 
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Table 1: The Five Largest Troubled Foreign Debtors, 1987 
Country 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Argentina 
Venezuela 
Philippines 
Total 
Foreign Debt 
$109 billion 
107 billion 
52 billion 
35 billion 
28 billion 
Status 
Seeking debt rescheduling, 
new loans from banks 
Negotiations finished, 
waiting for banks to sign on 
Negotiations on rescheduling and 
new loans under way 
Negotiations on rescheduling 
completed 
Negotiations on rescheduling 
under way 
Source: International Monetary Fund, other lending institutions 
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Table 2: Foreign Debt, Agricultural Imports, and Agricultural Exports 
Relative to Gross National Product and Correlations Among These 
Variables lor Seventy-three Developing Country Borrowers. 
1973-1983!! 
Correlations of Change in Three-Year Average 
Annual Change in: From 1973-75 to 1981-83 
FD/GNP FD/GNP Foreign Agr'l Agr'l 
With Change With Change Debt Imports Exports 
in in to to to 
Borrower Ag IM/GNP Ag EX/GNP GNP GNP GNP 
Algeria - 0.31 0.23 2.1 - 0.01 - 0.01 
Argentina 0.14 0.69 17.7 - 0.01 0.02 
Bangladesh - 0.02 0.19 28.8 - 0.03 0.01 
Benin, P.R. 0.12 0.26 40.3 0.32 - 0.05 
Bolivia 0.16 0.29 6.7 - 0.01 - 0.03 
Brazil 0.23 0.64 11.3 - 0.01 - 0.01 
Burma - 0.02 - 0.07 24.2 0.01 0.02 
Cameroon 0.44 0.22 15.7 - 0.01 - 0.10 
Chile 0.28 0.84 - 13.0 - 0.02 0.02 
Colombia - 0.38 - 0.16 2.1 - 0.01 - 0.02 
Congo, P.R. 0.58 0.27 23.3 - 0.01 - 0.04 
Costa Rica 0.53 0.76 92.1 0.01 0.08 
Cyprus - 0.39 0.08 18.6 - 0.02 0.01 
Dominican Rep. 0.38 - 0.48 9.8 - 0.02 - 0.09 
Egypt 0.59 0.26 18.6 0.03 - 0.05 
El Salvador - 0.18 - 0.57 12.5 0.01 - 0.04 
Ecuador 0.47 - 0.01 26.3 - 0.01 - 0.05 
Ethiopia - 0.42 - 0.41 12.8 0.01 - 0.01 
Gabon 0.67 0.36 - 12.9 0.02 - 8.04 
Ghana 0.68 0.79 - 14.3 - 0.03 - 0.13 
Greece 0.71 0.63 7.4 0.01 0.01 
Guatemala - 0.17 - 0.49 8.7 0.01 - 0.05 
Guinea 0.36 0.57 19.6 0.01 0.01 
Guyana 0.44 - 0.77 88.8 0.02 - 0.03 
Honduras - 0.31 0.14 34.1 - 0.01 0.02 
India 0.46 0.44 2.4 - 0.01 - 0.01 
Indonesia 0.80 0.45 - 5.7 - 0.01 - 0.03 
Israel 0.05 0.77 17.3 - 0.01 0.01 
Ivory Coast 0.70 0.10 44.9 0.01 - 0.05 
Jamaica 0.38 - 0.19 36.2 0.01 - 0.02 
Jordan 0.03 - 0.20 11.9 - 0.01 0.01 
Kenya 0-35 0.24 20.8 - 0.02 - 0.01 
Korea, R.P. 0.50 0.79 2.2 - 0.03 - 0.02 
Liberia 0.31 0.15 34.1 0.03 0.02 
Madagascar 0.59 - 0.72 45.6 0.01 - 0.02 
Malawi - 0.04 - 0.23 12.6 - 0.01 - 0.01 
Malaysia - 0.13 - 0.44 20.1 - 0.02 - 0.03 
Mali 0.60 0.87 - 14.0 - 0.10 0.01 
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Correlations of 
Annual Change in: 
Borrower 
Mauritania 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua, N.G. 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Senegal 
Singapore 
Somalia 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
FD/GNP 
With Change 
in 
Ag IM/GNP 
0.17 
0.04 
- 0.01 
0.25 
0.48 
- 0.12 
0.22 
- 0.11 
- 0.42 
0.16 
0.07 
0.06 
- 0.09 
- 0.24 
0.70 
0.17 
0.15 
0.42 
0.36 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
- 0.37 
0.07 
0.12 
- 0.09 
0.21 
- 0.19 
0.09 
0.59 
0 05 
0.01 
0.05 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen, Arab 
Yemen, Peoples 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
- 0.22 
0.20 
0.55 
- 0.07 
- 0.31 
FD/GNP 
With Change 
in 
Ag EX/GNP 
0.48 
0.75 
0.22 
0.29 
0.04 
0.62 
0.45 
- 0.21 
- 0.06 
0.12 
0.41 
0.69 
0.09 
0.46 
- 0 19 
0.73 
0.20 
0.66 
0.59 
0.47 
0.41 
- 0.20 
0.18 
- 0.50 
0.12 
0.49 
0.66 
0.86 
- 0.13 
0.26 
- 0.32 
0.76 
- 0.02 
- 0.21 
0.03 
Change in Three-Year Average 
From 1973-75 to 1981-83 
Foreign 
Debt 
to 
GNP 
99.0 
21.4 
44.7 
56.5 
26.4 
7.6 
- 3.1 
- 23.9 
33.6 
10.7 
2.2 
8.9 
16.4 
34.9 
33.1 
1.1 
58.4 
21.0 
41.5 
1.2 
5.9 
12.7 
86.4 
1.3 
14.6 
18.3 
0.5 
11.9 
10.9 
8.2 
78.4 
4.1 
31.5 
33.1 
13.4 
Agr'l 
Imports 
to 
GNP 
- 0.03 
0.01 
- 0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
- 0.01 
- 0.02 
- 0.01 
0.02 
- 0.03 
0.01 
- 0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
0.07 
- 0.04 
- 0.01 
- 0.03 
- 0.03 
0.01 
0.10 
- 0.01 
- 0.01 
- 0.01 
- 0.01 
- 0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
- 0.02 
- 0.03 
- 0.01 
0.01 
Agr' 1 
Exports 
to 
GNP 
0.10 
- 0.01 
- 0.02 
- 0.07 
0.01 
- 0.02 
0.01 
- 0.01 
- 0.02 
0.02 
- 0.07 
- 0.02 
- 0.06 
0.01 
- 0.04 
0.01 
0.01 
- 0.01 
- 0.07 
- 0.05 
- 0.05 
0.01 
0.01 
- 0.04 
- 0.03 
0.01 
- 0.08 
0.02 
- 0.01 
- 0.01 
- 0.02 
- 0.01 
- 0.02 
- 0.01 
0.02 
a/ Foreign debt is defined as,,public and"publicly guaranteed debt 
outstanding and Public and publicly guaranteed debt does not 
include data for: (a) transactions with the International Monetary 
Fund, with the exception of Trust Fund Loans; (b) debt repayable in 
local currency; (c) direct investment; and (d) short-term debt (that 
is, debt with original maturity of a year or less). 
Source: World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing Countries. The 
World Bank. Washington, D.C. 1983-84 and 1984-85 editions and 
calculations by the authors. 
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